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Richard R. Weiner
DISCOURSE AND ARGUMENT
IN INSTITUTING THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL LAW

Introduction
Social Rights were initially understood as the rights of a pluralism of instituted
associations; and transformed to the rights of distributive justice associated with the
politics of access to welfare state corporatism. More recently, they have been
understood as the rights of multicultural difference; and now as the rights to
complexity (Zolo), and rights to consideration of polycontextural effect vis-à- vis
transnational corporations (Teubner). Social rights are no longer subject positions
versus political bodies, but also against social institutions, in particular, vis-à-vis
centers of economic power.
This article studies the emergence of social rights and social law as an ontology of
institutional facts by which actors can be induced to share standards for self
governance, and be involved in public reasoning. Institutional space is understood as
never being closed; and as always open for argumentation, the novelty and creativity
of actors. Historical institutionalist approaches can be tweaked into a focus on the
promise of signifiers that have not yet delivered on their promise of order. Emergent
institutions/unfolding normativity are understood as constituted not by mythic
substance (Schmitt) but by warranted assertions (argument) by which we participate
in a promising game of institutional facticity (Habermas).
The architect Daniel Libeskind has written a noted lecture, “Traces of the Unborn.”
We might add, “Traces of the Stillborn.” There is a tendency in historical
institutionalism (HI) to concentrate on the retrieval of traces of paths taken rather than
(1) to consider the processes involved in the selection of paths; and (2) to reflect upon
the conditions of institutional emergence and sedimentation of paths, whether taken or
untaken. Contrary to the path-dependency obsessed historical institutionalism of a
Paul Pierson, this article stresses the significance of historical case studies of
institutional emergence in the earlier 20th century and their diremptive role within an
unfolding genealogy of knowledge--what Foucault referred to as “effective
history/critical history.” A more critically oriented historical institutionalism journeys
into the interior of institutions beyond “interestedness” toward “committedness,”
toward the endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of
legitimation.
The traces of the not yet or not fully born reveal the case of the law creating capacity
of autonomous collective associations. They shape their own autonomous domains
heteronomously, institutionalizing collective rationalities - -institutionally separated,
but recursively and complementarily connected to each other within a network. Such
institutional emergence in practice reflects liberalism‟s inability to grasp the
constitutive quality of collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20 th
century by organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of
globalized capital. How does liberalism cope with pluralism? How does it do so
beyond the legacy of premodern guild and collegial institutional forms?
1

I. Institutional Emergence:
The Institutionalizing Discourse of the Governance of Social Law
Post-liberal conceptions of governmentality, jurisprudence and institutional justice
emerged capable of providing a new substantive institutional foundation for the new
autonomous collective associations that transcended and surpassed the classical
liberal values privileging private property. These institutional conceptions
supplemented traditional liberal ones, but also built in democratizing institutional
practices within the governance autonomous collective associations. Beyond private
law welfare jurisprudence, emerged the governance of social law in the
experimentation of the Weimar Republic. 1
Conventional American and British political science have long taught us of the viral
shades represented in Weimar Republic efforts at democracy. Any remnants of
ghosts of Weimar needed to be exorcised in the building of modern industrial
democracy. However, in the past years, English-speaking audiences have been
reawakened to those Weimar efforts by histories of political and legal thoughts of the
likes of Franz Neumann and Hermann Heller. These have been provided by Bill
Scheuerman (1994), David Dyzenhaus (1997) and Peter Caldwell (1997). These
historical retrievals suggest an immanent tradition of social law and social rights
associated with the struggle to develop labor law, complementary institutions of
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This trace of the stillborn was generated out of the violent class struggles of mutinous sailors‟ councils outside Kiel in 1918 as
well as workers‟ councils springing up in Berlin. Out of these violent struggles, the jurist Hugo Preuss inserted key clauses on
social rights, works councils. Labor law and self-constituting social law into the Weimar Republic Constitution. At the end of
October 1918, sensing the First World War was lost, sailors of the German High Sea Fleet refused to obey orders to sail against
the British Fleet. Their revolutionary insurbordination caught fire. By 4 November, rioting sailors took control of Kiel and
together with dockers formed an Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council with revolutionary powers. By 7 November, the whole fleet
joined the Council Movement. On the 10th of November 1918 - - a day after the Kaiser‟s abdication and the end of imperial rule,
a day before the Armistice - - the Berlin Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council meeting in the Busch Circus and acting as the
representatives of all revolutionary workers and soldiers in the Reich, proclaimed a republican system of government.
Parliamentary socialist leaders like Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Schneidemann forestalled a proclamation of either a “socialist
republic” or a “republic of councils.” An Action Committee of the Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council was named to keep watch
over the republican government. Five days later, Hugo Stinnes, leader of the employers‟ trade association, and Carl Legien,
leader of the trade union confederation agreed to establish a “collectivist” system of labor-management arbitration committees, in
which trade unions would be given full recognition. The agreement was one of many seen as treaties of the organized versus
Bolshevism, against a movement of workers‟ councils (Rate) that challenged employer prerogative and sought a democratic
restructuring of capitalism starting from the workplace, and extending throughout the society. It was the time when a social
democratic government had the power to decree extensive nationalization, to socialize the mode of production.
In the months following, the future of Germany to a large extent lay in the hands of these conflicting political and industrial
organizations of the labor movement. Starting in December, paramilitary groups in Berlin (e.g., The Free Corps) acting in behalf
of the republican government engaged in bloody street battles with council supporters. By January 1919, the extreme left-wing
of the councils movement led the Spartacus rising for a Republic Council. The revolt was crushed; Spartakist leaders Rosa
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknicht were murdered by soldiers of the Free Corps. As the workers‟ and soldiers‟ councils were being
broken by the government and para-military troops acting on orders of the SPD coalition, focus shifted to factory councils and
workers‟ chambers as transforming agents of workers‟ control. Such organs were intended to make workers participant in the
overseeing and planning of production. An immanent tradition of social rights and social law was developed by what Claus Offe
refers to as the “Lawyers Socialism” of Franz Neumann and Herman Heller. This tradition and its advocates met the violent
reaction of fascism. Yet under the leadership of Neumann after 1945, the tradition was resurrected in the Bonn Republic
Constitution. Today, the tradition confronts the violence of hegemonic NeoLiberalism as the Schroder Coalition Government
attempts to maintain social rights and social law amidst the demographic and fiscal pressures of 21st century advanced industrial
society that shapes the Berlin Republic.
As Charles S. Maier notes, in Reshaping Bourgeois Europe (1975) the dawn of the Weimar Republic was not a socialist recasting
of politico-economic forces, but a corporatist one. Leaders of the traditional organizations of German labor, the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions, jealous of their newly won privileges, preferred to share their corporate influence
with management representatives on parity committees to any sense of proletarian socializing power. For six months in 1919
these newly legitimated social partners sought to contain the unorthodox extra-parliamentary organization and methods of
independent movement for direct workers‟ representation.
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collective bargaining, and institutional guarantees regarding education, the family,
health, work and codetermination. In an epoch of NeoLiberal undermining of the
institutions democratic movements constituted, should these Weimar efforts at
creative constructivist and reflexive jurisprudence be exorcised? Or rather adjured to
as an act of recommitment? Can these Weimar traces of the commitment to the
governance of social law and social rights be seen as traces of the not yet born, rather
than of the stillborn?
A genealogy of a German critical sociology of law is associated with the governance
of social law. Institutions position subjects ideationally. And the institutionalizing of
socially accountable private law as well as of social law and social rights occur within
an institutional context of the rule of law. Unlike private property rights, these new
institutional practices were the result of ongoing negotiated processes. This is what
Gerhard Lehmbruch (1996, 1998) labels Negotiated Democracy
(Verhandlungsdemokratie).
Peter Caldwell notes, in his critique of Scheuerman, that the term Social Rechtsstaat
(Sozialer Rechtsstaat) was a term used by Hermann Heller; and that it is best
translated into English as the Rule of Social Law--or the Governance of Social Law-rather than the “Social Rule of Law” State. Further, beyond the inter-individual
prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers the collective
constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and negotiation-one which established a scheme of internal governance and autonomous moral/power
resources, as well as a capacity for collective action.
A focus on social law centers on the law creating capacity of autonomous collective
associations. They shape their own autonomous domains heteronomously,
institutionalizing collective rationalities – institutionally separated, but recursively
and complementarily connected to each other within a network. Such institutional
emergency in practice reflects liberalism‟s inability to grasp the constitutive quality of
collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20th century by organized
/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of globalized capital.
This immanent institutional tradition is described somewhat by Oliver Gerstenberg
in his recent 2001/2002 articles – “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional
Idea for Europe?” (co-authored with Charles Sabel) in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse,
ed. Good Governance in Europe‟s Integrated Market. Oxford University Press, 2002:
289-341; and “Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism:
The Case of the European Community, “Ratio Juris, v. 14, n. 3 2001 (298-325).
Gerstenberg in the latter (p. 320, fn. 21) cites Harold Laski and Georges Gurvitch
in the first half of the 20th century as parallel “social law” sociology with a focus on
law “emergent” from a pluralism of groups – a tradition recognized by Robert Dahl
in his 1950-1990 work on the heteronomy of polyarchy, i. e., how a pluralism of
groups coordinated its democratically created policies without falling prey to the
Michelsian “iron law of oligarchy.” The focus is on autonomous subsystems of
governance, the decentralized multiplicity of spontaneous communication processes.
The legal theorist Guenther Teubner - who has followed his social law predecessors
at the London School of Economics, Otto Kahn Freund and Lord Wedderburn –
reflects to such a non-oligarchic horizontal coordination as hetarchy. This amounts to
a pluralization of deliberative democracy within the autonomous law-making of a
3

decentered society – either within national borders, or in the case of the European
Union across borders. Significantly, a good deal of focus on the governance of social
law and polyarchy traditions are in present day European Union studies. Gerstenberg
associated the governance of social law tradition with nineteenth century syndicalism
(Proudhon, Blanc, Pelletier) and its more functionalist/corporatist reinterpretation in
the twentieth century (Durkheim,Gurvitch, Lehmbruch). He tries to move beyond this
tradition, associating it with corporatist blockages and oligarchic short-circuiting of
grass roots democratic experimentation.
Alongside the social law tradition, Gerstenberg describes Teubner‟s
polycontexturality approach as a systems theory approach to emergent “heterchical
yet interconnected network-type linkage at the level of organizations and
professions.” This approach is seen as less functionalist and coordinated than
corporatism, but Gerstenberg sees it as focusing more on a created circuitry of pathdependency than on democratic path-shaping. Teubner looks to a multiplicity of subsystemic subconstitutions, where private law is constitutionally constrained to take of
its diverse social systemic context (hence polycontexturality). Danieto Zolo (1992)
adds a new level of social rights--the rights of complexity, the right to preserve
practices/processes necessary for social systems to retain pattern maintenance. These
can be ethnic or linguistic, community or neighborhood based, craftsman or expert
based.
Teubner‟s approach to the pluralism of non-state regimes/non-state actors--having
legal personality as legal subjects--is the successor to the earlier work of Gierke,
Maitland and Laski on the legitimated autonomy of collegial formation. This is the
autonomy of non-state governance regime--regimes of state-less law-regulating and
adjudicating wide areas of social activities. This is the recognition of the emergence
of autonomous subsystems of action typical for modern society. 2
Gerstenberg, along with Charles Sabel, eschew both corporatist functionalism and
the autopoesis of sub-systems networking for the pragmatism of what they label grass
roots democratic experimentation. They focus – along with Archon Fung and
Michael Dorf – on bootstrapping local autonomous deliberative democracy into a
“horizontal” coordination and monitoring procedure that preserves an emphasis on
citizen democratic deliberation both within the public sphere and private
organizations.
What all approaches share is a commitment to practices producing and reproducing
more social egalitarianism, more participatory democracy within economic
organizations and the workplace, and more of a pluralistic sensitivity to difference
and the social byproducts and consequences of economic life. And these
commitments are understood as complementary to liberal notions of contract and
property freedoms, but within a context of social choices and social responsibility.
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) used the notion of “the governance of the rule of law”
as the form to mediate the convergent genres of his two mentors, Otto von Gierke
2

Gunther Teubner: “Hybrid Laws: Constitutionalizing Private Governance Networks” in Robert
Kagen, M. Krygier and K. Winston, eds. Legality and Community (Berkeley, CA Public Policy Press,
2002), pp. 311-331; and “Coincidentia Oppositorum: Networks and the Law Beyond Contract and
Organization, The 2003/04 Storrs Lecture at Yale Law School.
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and his London School of Economics (LSE) tutor Harold Laski. These are the
Continental European traditions of Rechsstaat and Genossenschaft (fellowship
associations) with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of “the rule of law.”
The concept of a Social Rechtsstaat derives from the collective bargaining
agreement‟s overcoming the prerogative contract associated with the master/servant
relation and establishing a framework of internal self-governance herein alternative
norms other than the liberal institution of property are understood as supportive of
autonomy. It is distinct from the Liberal Rechtsstaat of Kant and Weber and the
Social State of state-administered social benefits we come to identify with the
Keynesian Welfare State. As we have backed into a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat notion
these past two decades, the path left open is to once more explore the Social
Rechtsstaat: a relation of state and civil society assuring autonomous institution of
self-critical governance for diverse domains, reflexively responsible both within
institutional spheres and between institutional spheres. This is the theoretical mission
of the present day London School of Economics (LSE) troika of Anthony Giddens,
Gunther Teubner and Ulrich Beck, and follows in a less skeptical Michelsian manner
the pioneering sociology of Philip Selznick and SM. Lipset.
The governance of social law is understandably a precondition for the rule of
democratic law. Social rights assure individual enjoyment of primordial liberal rights.
The Social Rechtsstaat is more self-binding than the interventionist Sozial Staat (or
Wohlfahrtstaat). And it is an institutional precondition for actualizing the Democratic
Rechtsstaat in modern (or late modern) capitalism. See Figure 1 below.
A postliberal form such as the Social Rechtsstaat model is oriented to setting up
institutions of moral discipline (i.e., governance) which can make us autonomous/selfdetermining citizens enjoying basic rights. They organize state/civil society relations
into a coherent system of normative discourse of constitutive and regulative and
institutionalizing practices.
Rechtsstaat denotes law having rational and secular justification associated with a
state or sovereign, as distinguished from premodern notions of traditional law,
institutes of “organic” orders, or Natural Law. Rechtsstaat is a continental European
tradition and different from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the “Rule of Law”
associated with parliamentary supremacy and the genesis of law in the representatives
of citizens. Neumann used the term “governance of the rule of law” as the form
mediating these two convergent genres. And in his own attempts to deal with the
pluralist implications of Gierke and his mentor at the London School of Economics
Harold Laski, there is a fruitful tension in appreciating the extent to which phenomena
called “state” or “sovereign” operates within a realm of legality, accountability, an
independent judiciary, and a neutral and predictable set of procedures for applying the
law. Law cannot be normless nor cannot be formless. The state is able through its
sovereign to create and change the substance of the law. At the same time, the
societal sphere is protected against state intervention by (1) rights explicit or implicit
constituted by human beings, (2) general norms and (3) the postulate of the
“generality of law.”
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FIGURE 1
1

2
SOCIAL
RECHTSSTAAT

SOCIAL WELFARE
STATE/
SOZIAL STAAT

(public law
moving toward
social law)

(public law as a
administrative law)

3

4
LIBERAL
RECHTSSTAAT

NEOLIBERAL
RECHTSSTAAT

(private law
with regulation)

(private law
without regulation)

For Neumann, the governance of social law remained the unfinished project of the
Rule of Law, the metaphysical functional equivalent of Natural Law, and the vital
undercurrent in social democratic thinking latently present within the stronger statist
and regulation-centured socialist mainstream. It is historically more closely tied to
the legal practices associated with syndicalism and the trade union movement than to
the ideological or theoretical activities oriented toward political parties. The
generation of collective bargaining agreements, labor courts, and works communities
are but a historical instance of the governance of social law. Individual contractbased law is challenged, and private property rights are adapted to “social ordering”
- - a constitutional ordering of the economy and society. This is an institutionalizing
discourse bent on actualizing the substance of social egalitarianism, and serving as
corrective and alternative norms and forms vis-á-vis the liberal institutions of property
are not the only ones than can support autonomy.
The social law tradition and concept of Social Rechtsstaat captures best the approach
of Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Making use of the Genossenchaft theory of Otto
Gierke, Sinzheimer challenged the “concession theory” of legal groups of German
positive and Roman law. Like Frederick Maitland, John Figgis, and Harold Laski in
England, Sinzheimer argued that social groups are “organic entities, autonomously
6

capable of willing and acting rather than legally fictitious personalities as they were
understood under Roman law. These authentic group personalities make their own
rules - - what Gierke called “social law.” Collective bargaining agreements fit this
new category. Gierke‟s theory meant that labor unions as well as employer
associations were legitimate groups with rights and duties. These groups could speak
through their own organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, that is, their
own social law takes legal priority over the simple individual labor contract. Beyond
the inter-individual prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers
the collective constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and
negotiation - - one which established a scheme of internal governance and
autonomous moral/power resources, as well as a capacity for collective actions.
This Weimar generated critical sociology of law tradition speaks to an American New
Deal context wherein legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act were written in the language of
private law norms. Such legislation was constituted in terms of a sense of
entrepreneurial individuals‟ respective responsibilities, rather than in terms of the
political economy of social citizenship connected to Continental European and
Skandinavian welfare states.
A neglect of this key difference often blocks the English-speaking from
understanding the sensibilities of European social democracy. It is ironic that the
perceived failures of New Deal generated social rights - - one tied to a private law
welfare jurisprudence rather than to some sense of the governance of social law have
been at the heart of the NeoLiberal assertion in the USA and Britain of market rights
to choose, and the neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility and initiative.
II. Understanding Regime Models Beyond the Interest Group Approach/
Relating Institutions to Normative Unfolding
The past three decades have seen a de-socializing of governance--an increasing
privatization of risk management and a dismantling of a pluralism reconceived as
interest group liberalism in post-Neo Deal America or as a more encapsulated
negotiated process of neocorporatism in Western Europe. We move from a Social
State (Sozialer Staat) of Keynsian welfare state insulated and exclusionary
paternalism to a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat and associated Civil society, where we are
less a client and more an empowered customer/consumer--armed with powers of
choice and contractualism--vis-à-vis health services education and training.
“Enterprise yourself” is the NeoLiberal mentality and form of life--the internal
normative logic of a new regime reasserting private law notions of entitlements.
NeoLiberalism is a movement to actualize a utopia--the regime model of turn of the
twentieth century neoclassical economics with its emphasis on markets. It was a
predominant regime model before the onslaught of social theory and its emphasis on
social solidarism, social citizenship, social rights. Also threatening was the emerging
regime of social law with its challenge to the liberal notion of property, and its
development of the negotiated collective bargaining contract beyond the individual
prerogative contract.
Generated out of a concern for improving a national economy‟s competitiveness and
flexibility, NeoLiberalism emphasizes a strong focus on the short-term, and neglect of
7

longer term concerns. There is an emphasis on discrete short term contracts rather
than longer term relational contracts creating constellations of trust. 3 Growing
privatization of risk cuts into solidarism. Market relations are imposed in spheres
(universities, prisons, the caring professions) where classical and neoclassical liberal
economics would not go. Further the NeoLiberal utopia imposes a homogenizing
effect on the plurality of institutional regimes it confronts. All interactions are
reduced to abstracted transaction cost economics. In the effort to move flexibly gear
the national economy competitiveness to the emergent globalized economic order.
There is a movement from demand-side to supply-side concerns, from centralized
neocorporatist bargaining regimes to a proliferation of decentered/decentralized
bargaining subsystems. Figure 1 can be reconfigured as Figure 2 below. Here we
can adapt one of the four-fold tables in Bo Rothstein‟s Just Institutions Matter
(1997:201).

FIGURE 2

Regimes are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing negotiations
among a formally specified set of actors - - an institutional setting within which
negotiations can take place, and both bonding and blind force can be assured. A
regime offers

3

See Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Capitalism: Firms,Markets, Relational Contracting (New
York: The Free Press, 1985) which builds on the work of Ian Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long
Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law,” Northwestern
University Law Review 72 (1978): 854-905. Williamson recognizes that between the neoclassical and
relational contracting schemes, there is a shift of emphasis from the original agreements in the former
to the entire relation as it evolves through time in the latter. The relational nature of the “contracting”
becomes more binding than the legal guarantee and enforcement mechanisms. Relational contracts are
the informal and unwritten agreements within and between firms. These agreements as to vertical and
horizontal integration are sustained by the value of future relationships and can be described in
repeated game models. They circumvent difficulties in the formal individuals-based pregotative
contract. Thus networks of relational contracting take into account an interactive normative order
wherein mutually accepted interpretation emerges.
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a template of normative understandings



a specific mode of legal discourse corresponding to the logic of
argumentative practices for fair negotiations based on discourse
specific norms



a model of institutional justice; and



a utopian model for re-visioning practices.

A regime is an ensemble of constitutive discourse providing the imaginary framework
through which we interpret the symbolic order into which we are drawn, if not
thrown. It is a carrier of institutionalizing practices and governance rationales. And,
as an internal ensemble of discourse generating both legitimation and truth claims, it
is open to interpellation/interrogation. It has been the Right rather than the Left that
has managed to articulate a rationality of governance consonant with a new regime of
the self. To a large extent, the regime of social democracy, while competing
rationality with liberalism, is grounded in a liberal base.
The interest group approach of comparative political sociology in the 1950s and
1960s (David Truman, Gabriel Almond, Earl Latham, Reinhard Bendix, Lewis Coser,
Ralf Dahrendorf) made no effort to examine either the objective material conditions
or the already regulated or intersubjectively constituting normative conditions relating
to the formation of interest groups themselves. Stanley Rothman noted four decades
ago (1960; 25) what we want to know, and where David Truman does not help us at
all, is why the content of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes
certain forms at certain times and not at others.
The interest group approach was effectively challenged at the dawn of the 1970s by
the social movement literature of Alain Touraine, Cornelius Castoriadis and Claus
Offe - - specifically on the very process of interest group formation and the creation
of new norms and values. Institutions are understood as playing a mediating role as
mechanisms for regulating conflict - - “mechanisms for arriving at decisions, the
application of which is sanctioned by legitimate authority.” (Touraine, 1977: 178-79;
cf Offe : 54.) This implies that there are operative norms prior to politics, learned
legitimations - - so that “all claims are not negotiable” (Offe 1976 : 43). Touraine
(1977: 196) anticipates historical institutionalism by denoting how social action is
circumscribed by a defined and particular historical context - - one that orients the
field of social relations as well as the stakes in every kind of conflict or negotiation.
The nature of path dependency is heavily influenced by the operative norms set by
politically active members of the society - - i.e., an elite. But Touraine and
Castoriadis pointed to the differing and contradictory role expectations at work in any
instituted configuration - - and that these differences and contradictions do not simply
originate in the operative norms themselves. Discursive traces of alternative
institutionalizing practices are always at work. And these, Touraine notes (362,311)
“overflow the frame in which they appear” and “mobilize demands which cannot be
entirely satisfied” within the interior arc of subject positions within a preconfigured
regime and its frame of practical reasoning and learning.
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Beyond Isaac Balbus‟s notion of latent groups and class determinism, there is another
approaching and veering off from Truman. 4 This is now less in terms of class
determinism or epochal/regime periodization - - as in the Regulation Theory approach
(Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta, Alan Lipietz) - - and possibly more in terms of a
transformative discursive modality detectable within the normative categorials of a
predicate logic. Beyond Truman‟s discussion of potential groups, we can focus on
potential norms, emergent institutions.
Beyond the 1970s turning to latent groups, social movements and structured
inequality came respectively an institutionalist and a discursive turn, as political
sociology focused more and more on normative commitment. As Douglas North
noted (1990) institutions were increasingly seen as the missing element in
comprehending the normative framework of cooperative and competitive
relationships.
For the “new institutionalism”of DiMaggio and Powell (1991 :11), institutions were
seen as establishing the very criteria by which people discover their preferences.
Institutions were increasingly seen as constitutive of preference-formation, and not
just as strategic environments within which actors pursue exogenously-given interests.
Much of the new institutionalism was to become preoccupied with a cognitive
bedrock of shared normative constructions - - templates and constructionism became
the hegemonic buzzwords. For a summary of the new institutionalisms, see Figure 3
below.
The turn toward normative commitment and normative regulation served to
counteract the emphasis on interest aggregation; and - - as Joseph Heath in
Communicative Action and Rational Choice (2001: 309) notes - - “to counteract the
general tendency of human affairs to go very badly when left to self-interest.”
Legitimation was understood in the communications theory of Habermas as the
“warranted assertions of substantive rationality” eschewed by Weber‟s rationalization
theory; and bracketed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia not as ideational
constructions constitutive of knowledge, but as superstructural illusions materially
produced and periodized. Critical here is the constructionist reprise of the Sociology
of Knowledge approach of Berger and Luckmann as well as of Mannheim.
Habermas‟ ongoing project pushed us to recognize how we are socialized to develop a
higher disposition in our practical reasoning, one that enable us to assign normative
reasons priority over the institutional ones . One that enables us to appreciate how we
can distill underlying norms from the institutional context, from their experience as
practices. And in doing so, how to boil off the normative predicate logic of a
substantive rationality.

4

Isaac Balbus, “The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxist Analysis, Politics and Society, V.1
(1972).
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FIGURE 3
SI
Cultural case study
applying
organizational theory;
ethno methodology;
the “new
institutionalism” as
“embeddedness”
theory
NORMS (conventions,
cultural constraints)

II/CI
Immanent
critique/interpellation of
argumentative logic along
an internal “arc of subject
positions” (path shaping)

HI
Historical sociology
case study focusing on
“collective agency”
(path dependency)

RCI
Optimizing strategic
behavior as case study
(methodological
individualism)

IDEAS and their
warranted assertions

Endogenous
constitution of actors
through institutions
Evolutionary with
reinterpretation

Endogenous ideational
perceptual and discursive
factors
Diremptive crossing of
institutional thresholds

RULES (path
dependency
regularities)
Endogenous
preference formation

PROCEDURES and
their opportunity
structures
Exogenous preference
formation
Transaction cost

Evolution
of
institutions

Cognitive / memory
culture / mythologizing

The imaginary institution
of society (path shaping)

Theoretical
fix

Theory of legitimation

Theory of legitimation

Approach
to practical
reasoning

Logics of
appropriateness

Immanent rationality
(bounded & unbounded
rationality)
IDEATIONAL/CRITICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM

Delegated
subinstitutions‟
potential expansion
Contingent path
dependency with
unintended
consequences
Mix of theory of
preference hierarchy
with theory of
legitimation
Logics of bounded
rationality
HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM

RATIONAL CHOICE
INSTITUTIONALISM

Approach

Focus

Preference
Formation
Creation of
Institutions

SOCIOLOGICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM

Bargaining

Theory of preference
hierarchy

Logics of bounded
rationality

We are unbracketing legitimation forms that Berger and Luckmann as well as
Mannheim treat sociologically without considering their ontological and
epistemological claims. Legitimations, represent the substance by which our
preferences are ordered. And Habermas‟s legitimation theory involves taking up
“warranted assertions” with their “sense of appropriateness” and attendant
constitutive “application discourse” - - all of which are ultimately testable in the
“transcendent discourse” of universalizability/generalizability. (See Klaus Gunther,
1988).
Habermas‟ legitimation theory breaks as well with rational choice institutionalism
(RCI) and its preference-hierarchy, transaction cost minimizing behavior and utility
calculi - - which Hall and Soskice (2000) might yield too much ground to. RCI starts
with preferences that are exogenous to a model where all factors are held constant.
Nothing is prior to individual utility calculi. And institutions are understood as
merely vehicles for respective utility maximizations. RCI cannot account for the
social, only what is at base intentional - - only what is strategic pursuant to
exogenously given interests. Again, we return to the counterpoint - - the discursive
approach to the substantive rationale of legitimating conduct, and its engagement of
the instrumental rationale of strategy and preference. Crucial is the former‟s focus on
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an internalist conception of legitimation. 5 The constellation of positions within a
legitimating argument is internal to the argument itself. It is an endogenous
constellation of positions that a subject discursively takes in order to redeem
normative commitments boiled-off in unbracketed form from their institutional
husks.6
The commitments - - i.e., justifications in discoursive theoretical terms - - make
claims upon acting subjects. They exist independently of the acting subjects. Not just
as a legacy or an institutional supply of justification, but as a trajectory with
semblances and traces along an arc of subject positions. This internalist trajectory is
itself a contingent byproduct of accumulating social conflict and cooperation. The
trajectory and its arc - - which characterize the endogenous constellation of subject
positions within normative argument - - moves us to an evaluation of possible
normative alternatives.
Thinking in terms of constellations, trajectories and arcs enable us to see how
legitimating claims and strategies exist independently of actors and are drawn upon by
actors. As Andrew Sayer reminds us, “(T)he political discourse exists as it is
regardless of whether I study it and whatever I think of it.” 7 The dynamic of the
constellation of discourse is something acting subjects internally (endogenously)
participate in and constitute as they go along. The constellation is constituted as we
interrogate it. Our contingent articulation involves less a functional playing of roles,
and more of an authorial interpreting and infusing of roles with our instituting
imaginary. 8 The constellation comprises a predicate logic - - with warrant predicates
and truth predicates; with assertoric claims and validity claims; and with application
discourse and generalizability discourse. (See Heath, 2001, and Gunther, 1988).
Beyond Truman, the nature of our on-going willingness to “play by the rules” is
subject to positioned criteria of warranted assertability. These criteria, claims of
rightness and their propositional content are reflexively reconstructable - - rationally
reconstructable - - as Habermas labels this internal constellation of normative
commitment and attendant argument. They are rationally reconstructable as
unfolding normativity.
This is not just a bounded rationality of recombinatory elements, but an imaginative
projecting of a growing rationality. 9 This is an imaginative projecting and
reconstructing that enables us to recognize the new - - that is, the “novel” - - within an
institutional trajectory. It is also an explaining of (1) either institutional stability; or
(2) how ideas about institutional change or transformation fit into a hermeneutical
5

Bernhard Peters, “On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory” in Mathieu Deflem, ed. Habermas,
Modernity and Law (London: Sage, 1996),: pp. 101-134.
6
Ota Weinberger: “Habermas on Democracy and Justice: Limits of a sound conception,” Ratio Juris
(1994), pp. 239-253; and Law, Institution and Legal Politics (Boston: Reidel, 1991). See also Neil
MacCormick and O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Boston: Reidel/Klawer, 1986).
7
Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science. (London: Sage, 2000) p. 34.
8
See Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. K. Blarney. (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press 1987). First published in France, 1975: cf. David Runciman. Pluralism and the Personality
of the State. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
9
Hans Joas: “On Articulation,” paper presented at the “Conference on Cornelius Castoriadis:
Rethinking Autonomy” at Columbia University, 1 December 2000; The Genesis of Values. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000; and “Institutionalization as a Creative Process: The Sociological
Importance of Cornelius Castoridias‟ Political Philosophy,” American Journal of Sociology. 94
(1993), pp. 1184-1199.
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circle of argumentation and interpretation - - an endogenous source of change within a
constellation of discourse. They do not merely fit within pre-existing institutions - their tree-like roots, and their capillary growth of outcome paths. “Ideas provide the
point of mediation between actors and their environment.”10 (Hay 2001: Chapter 5).
The subject actors‟ point of access to their densely structured context is irreducibly
ideational - - and discursive.
Bob Jessop‟s “strategic-relational approach” (Jessop: 1997, 2000) melds well with
path dependency HI. Within a given specific context, there is an unevenly distributed
configuration of opportunity and constraint for subject actors. And along with it a
structural “strategic selectivity,” that is, only certain specific paths of strategic action
are available, and only some of these are likely to be actualized in actors‟
intentionality. As in RCI, only some actors “read” the paths effectively - - but this is
so as a result of there not being the perfect information assumption “all things being
equal” in much neoclassical economics and rational choice theory. Hay modifies
Jessop, by stressing how actors without complete information need to interpret the
world on the basis of a constellation of ideas in order to orient themselves
strategically, to reflexively monitor both the context and consequences of their
actions. Thus there is as well a “discursive selectivity” derived not from material
structure, but from the claims and frames yielded in an interrogation of the
constellations of interpretation and argumentation that function as cognitive filters,
embedded and growing within institutions - - that function as the language of a text, a
narrative about structured material inequality, latent groups as well as normative
commitment. The claims and frames are yielded in the strategies which subject actors
devise as a means to: (1) realize their intentions upon a material context which favors
(“selects”) certain strategies; and (2) accommodate their normative commitments in
so doing. This is not idealism, but an ideational accessing with both the material and
normative context. This is not the longings of desire or the imposition of cognition;
rather, it is an engaging of the discursive with the material environment, not a
dissolving.
This is a relating of a theory of institutions to a theory of normative unfolding. This is
as a substantive theory and not merely a proceduralist formalism, not as an essentialist
mythic/mystic narrative of some inherent national ordering. Two decades of
sympathetic critics - - such as Klaus Hartmann, Ota Weinberger and Ottfried
Hoffe - - have urged Habermas to grasp the need for a theory of institutions which he
could ground his discourse theory in - - as a theory of Institutional Normativism (IN).
III. Critical Theory as Critical Institutionalism
What historical institutional (HI) finds in the institutional trajectory of unfolding
normativity and its arc of subject positions is not idealism but discursive selectivity - one which remains in dialectical tension with the exogenous structural selectivity of
material incentive and opportunity structures. This results in a constant dialogic
tension confronting the discursive theoretical terms of an HI modified by
communications theory into a theory of legitimation we will call Critical
Institutionalism (CI). This is a dialogic tension with the strategic opportunism
inherent in RCI and evolutionary institutional economics. Habermas helps HI with its
persistent troubles with ideas, the constellation of legitimating, and normative
10
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commitment. On the other hand, HI poses a final “way out:” to Habermas‟s persistent
and unnecessarily confining problem of equating strategy with ultimately utility-based
technique and purely instrumental reasoning; and second to his separating the realm
of normativity and law from institutional facts. See Figure 4 below.
HI has been open to acknowledging exposure ideas, but tends not to see ideas as
normative contents within institutional practices. Conceptualizing HI as a
legitimation theory enables us to conceive of the ordering of preferences less
structurally, and more endogenously within a constellation of discourse/argument-where institutional commitments “ghost the future” in traces and semblances of the
unborn, or not yet actualized.
Institutions contain within them a normative core--a chain of practical reasoning/a
constellation of action-related argumentation. Jurgen Habermas offers HI procedural
normative models by which the cognitive (i.e., validity) claims within such
argumentation can be made meaningful--in terms of the legitimation they immanently
project. Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger sympathetically modify Habermas.
They refer to two modification as Institutional Normativism (IN), ideas are not to be
bracketed, but are to be subject to reflexive reconstruction as a form of discourse
(practical reasoning) so that normative potentialities made available by collective
learning processes are scanned for realizability.
In contrast to either the “brute facticity” of empiricism or the counterfactual chimera
of procedural normativisism, (IN) focuses on normative contents within institutional
or institutionalizing practices, “institutional facticity”--i.e., the nature of our
participation in the promising game and obligation game inherent in legitimation.
Ideational structures that are the byproduct of the rearticulation of bargaining power
within conflict become institutionalized and normalized as “facts,” and their
warranted assertions as “immanent forms.” IN is rationally reconstructive of the
institutionalizing “warranted assertions” involved in our participation within
emergent forms of life.
“Critical Theory redeems past hope in the name of the future by revealing the as yet
unrealized potentials of the present.”11 It asks to what extent sedimented and floating
signifiers have not yet delivered on their promise of a substantive order. Unlike the
Sociology of Knowledge of Karl Mannheim or Berger and Luckmann, critical theory
does not deny the immanent development and affirmation of changed and new forms - changed and new conceptual mediations of social reality - -- as a process of
knowledge driven by an inner dialectic, as an unfolding of categorial analysis whose
immanent predicate logic provides the basis for critique.
Critical Theory is a theory of legitimation as rational aspiration. It uncovers and
measures its utopian content - - the substance of the organizing principles embedded
within its worldview (Weltanschaung), its mental model. Critical Theory tests the
warranted assertions and truth claims of legitimations inherent within an institutional
legacy, an institutional trajectory, and the arc of an institution‟s anticipated horizon
(or constellation). It is a form of self-reflective knowledge in itself. 12
11
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Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Pp.
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A theory of legitimation is grounded in actors‟ valuation of what is right. And the
more ideational institutionalism we have posed reflects the tradition of
institutionalism as institutional embodiment of normative substance, rather than the
tradition of evolutionary institutional economics. It is legitimated intersubjectivity as
a substance with its own internal principles - - its own entelechies. (See Massimo
LaTorre, 1999).
Historical institutionalism (HI) conceptualized as a theory of legitimation can account
for this ideational foundation of institutions.13 Part of the gap in HI results from the
fact that practicing political sociologists - - often by training - - skeptical or dismissive
of the possibility of any rational grounding for unfolding normativity.
A substantive understanding of institutionalism is one that fills gaps, aporias (in both
Derrida‟s and Benhabib‟s terms), and situations of undecidability with semblances
(Adorno), iterable traces or spectral presences (Derrida). And a Critical
Institutionalism (CI) resulting from the grounding of Habermas‟s brand of critical
theory as discourse theory in a theory of institutional facts resists the gapless
normativism of a Kelsen or a Langdell, it as well resists the equally positivist
imprinting of the black letter law without recourse to Natural Law. And for that
matter, Habermas‟s surrogate for Natural Law--a proceduralist transcendental
formalism known as the Theory of Communicative Competence with its test n the
court of the Ideal Speech Situation. Note Figure 4 below.
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In confronting the NeoLiberal challenge to all forms of sociality/solidarity, such a
critical institutionalism would follow the jurisprudence of Richard Fallon in probing
the inherent intelligibility within the fluidity of constructivist norm creation beyond
the narrower interpretive mode of Richard Epstein and Antonin Scalia. Substantive
13
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design by constituting interpretive communities displaces individualist formalized
law.
The CI developed here evaluates the forms by which societies evaluate themselves,
that is, the formal ordering of what Ottfried Hoffe has referred to as “Institutional
Justice.” Hoffe understands a juridico-discursive--like Bo Rothstein--order in the
“discourse theoretical terms” of argumentative forms, rather than in an engagement
with chimerical counterfactuals. These argumentative forms serve as the vehicles by
which we extend the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the
marketplace and civil law as governmentality - - governance rationales used in
practices, rather than idealizations (chimera). This involves discourses answering
practical questions--and with it a discursive selectivity testing for the dialogic claims
of an unredeemed predicate logic, beyond the functional sociological compliance and
justification of a strategic selectivity.
Critical institutionalism as a capstone to historical institutionalism (HI) can be
understood as an internalist principled game, a language game


wherein norms rather than some mythic/mystic substance is experienced as
inner institutional morality (Hermann Heller),



wherein deliberation defines its own guiding norms and practices as an
institutionalizing governance rationale (Jurgen Habermas),



wherein norms are not understood as objects of pure cognition, but as
values we commit ourselves to in our practices: (Georges Gurvitch); and



wherein norms emerge as the socially shared solutions to problems and as
byproducts of repeated social conflicts - - from which they are transformed
into a constellation of learned normative commitments, revealed as
promises.14

Here the “institutional” represents the non-contractual dimension of obligation - - the
shared standards of self-governance, and valuation, the normative commitments and
promises of a “promising game constituted in and through discourse theoretical
terms. 15
Criticial institutionalism like the “critical history” posed by Michel Foucault and
Mitchell Dean goes beyond posing critical junctures of contingent emergence. 16 It
involves a capacity to engage in interrogation of the internalist principled/promising
game - - wherein discourse is ontologically prior to identity-formation, and legitimacy
is prior to legality. “No individual can choose to stand outside the totality of the
interpretive frameworks of discourse written into our very human condition.” 17
Institutional Justice involves the legitimated ordering of regimes - - substantively and
procedurally - - in terms of formal models of law and political economy.
14
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Subject positions - - themselves constituted discursively - - are an ensemble of
interpretative schema responsive to structural positions. 18 They are drawn upon as
legitimating strategies and mark how we experience our structural position within the
social. ( Here see the development of this concept from Gramsci through Althusser
through Laclau and Mouffe. 19) Thus we are not just bearers of supports, but actors
who draw upon a repertoire of discourse resources - - within a discursive structure of
signifiers - - interpretive schema, rights, claims and collective identities tied to subject
positions. We are actors who draw on legitimations of purposive and substantive
argumentation.
Subject position within respective regimes of law and political economy can be
rationally reconstructed in discourse. In doing so the internal relations of an
immanent normative unfolding or a projected re-institutionalizing of practices can be
gauged - - in the discourse theoretical terms of argumentative forms, i.e., discursive
selectivity. Subject positions are more in a condition of floating signifiers that have
not yet delivered on its promises, on its normative commitments, on its reflected
visions. And moving along the interior arc of a regime‟s subject positions, we move
beyond the configurative paths, junctures and practices of “effective history”
practiced by HI, toward a “critical history” associated with CI. The latter employs
more of a diremptive approach - - a key phrase from Habermas and ironically Georges
Sorel before him. The diremptive approach attempts to reflect reality at more than
one moment, one instance.
Legitimations are positioned in narratives and worldviews/world picture - - not as
static snapshots, but as panning shots of a regime in motion - - with social movement,
swelling beyond thresholds, and institutional emergence. A diremptive approach
scans a constellation of instances that open up to montage-like presentation


where genres return to haunt us not just as memory, but also as
possibility of uncanny actualization; and



wherein the future is never either fully determinable or fathomable, but
only grasped and recognized as traces or semblances - - moved by the
necessity of truth, rather than the arbitrariness of ideology - -within
the gaps among the intermittent rhythms, sequences and jumpcuts.

Critical instiutionalism (CI) complements historical institutionalism by keeping us
aware that the swelling of historical movement and change is an instance of
displacement, as much as it is path-dependent. This is the displacement of one
threshold for another. History, Walter Benjamin advised us, is never wrapped into a
specific moment of a fixed juncture. Rather, it flows in a passage that swells beyond
the limits of its epoch, of its period. It confronts a gap - - or aporia - - and makes up
for it by constituting a canal for the displacement of the swelling (schwelle), a
superimposition of a threshold.20
18
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IV. The Argumentative Turn: Categorically Grasping the Signifiers within
Pluralist Social Subjects of Rights
The promise of the signifiers of the Governance of Social Law have only partially
delivered in their promise of a new institutional order. As Adorno notes, the
democratic imaginary seeks traces of a prospect of utopia within a society that
continually betrays it, tracing its own claims which ghost the future.
To what extent can liberalism offer a convincing account of the democratic
citizenship adaptable to the provocation of non-statist institutions? Following Laski
rather than Schmitt, sovereignty in the past century reflects social compacts rather
than separate state apparatuses per se. A regime of the Autonomous Social uncoupled
from the State and linked through complementary institutions within civil society is
bent on institutionalizing itself as a form of life, as a postliberal governance rationale.
Following Laski rather than Schmitt,we need to accommodate rather than exorcise a
pluralism of heteronomous regulatives and constitutives. Out of the accelerating
pluralism of the past century, emerges a plan of signifiers in the practical and
discursive struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights rather than the Marxist
monist Social Subject of Rights - - another sense of sovereignty eclipsed.21 The
Governance of Autonomous Social Law derives from deliberation as an effect - - as a
discourse finds its own subjects. Such pluralist deliberation is the source of its
legitimation, rather than some higher law or some gapless system of norms. This
trace of a tradition of discourse associated with an emergent practice and juridification
draws on the categorical framing of a democratic imaginary in its historical struggles
and in its immanent potential.
The practices and forms of the Governance of Social Law can be grasped
categorically as assertional commitments (Brandom), and not counterfactually as
chimera (G.A. Kelly). Chimera are anti-historical. The issue of immanent historical
warrants - - rather than visions of order - - are immanent within the core of practices,
immanent within a regime of discourse whose claims are interrogated/interpellated.
This immanence is inherent in what George Hendrik von Wright22 would call a quasiteleology of normic statements - - that is, legitimating, propositional claims. A
Critical Institutionalism (CI) goes beyond the Sociology of Knowledge in
unbracketing normative commitments from practices, from their institutional husks.
Categorial form is created in historical time but attains independent validity as the
argument behind an institutionalizing practice is interpellated and gauged. Beyond
the Sociology of Knowledge, Institutional Normativism (IN) starts with a
genealogical study of the evolution of institutional practices as reworkable traces of
affirmative substance, the substance of an emergent form of legitimation. Then IN is
transformed into CI in its interpellation of the legitimating argument itself, which
guides the “imaginary institution of society.”
21
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Beyond HI, and its focus on path dependency, Critical Theory as CI and “critical
history” understands a process of self-clarification and emergent possibility internal to
a historical process, internal to the argument of normative principles that are the core
of institutional/institutionalizing subjects. Following the anthropologist Mary
Douglas in How Institutions Think (1986), institutions can be conceptualized as
subjects of action, as bearer of practices and their normative claims/commitments. A
Critical Institutionalism looks beyond the “discursive selectivity” of some logic of
appropriateness and the interestedness of actors‟ application of that logic, what
Schattschneider once called the “mobilization of bias.” CI looks beyond
“interestedness” toward “commitedness.” In this way CI may have more in common
with Philip Selznick‟s “old institutionalism” with its focus on the affirmativity of
institutional commitments as an ontology of institutional facts, rather than the focus of
RCI on “contracting.”
Beyond interestedness and discursive selectivity, we are moved to focus on discursive
commitment itself rather than merely the application of the commitment. We are
moved to a theory of legitimation rather than of interest groups, to a commitedness to
rights and procedures.
Rational Reconstruction can be understood externally/explicitly as the process tracing
of the contingent interaction, the discursive selectivity of policy-makers‟ performance
and claims within a path dependent institutional context.
Rational Reconstruction can also be understood as a more internalist/implicit
interpellation of the commitments themselves: their warrants, their propositions, the
arguments immanent within path shaping/institutionalizing practice “boiled off from
their institutional husks.”
Figure 5 below, describes the dialectical relationship between the explicit
performative practices and norms and the more depth-level implicit values and
warranted assertions. Rational reconstruction is more than retrieval--it is the
reconstruction of a set of practices we have come to learn, and the underlying values
by which legitimation claims are evalualed.
Social Subjects of Rights are inscribed in material practice - - not as a system of ideas
in people‟s heads, but as material practices existing in people‟s conduct according to
their commitments. These material practices can be understood not only in terms of
an ordinary causal emergence reducible to micro-properties, and path dependency
within predetermined paths of appropriateness. These practices can also be
conceptualized in terms of a novel path-shaping and holistic emergency wherein a set
of properties (such as the Governance of Social Law) may be determined by and
dependent on other properties, but not reducible to those others. 23
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FIGURE 5
5A.

The EXPLICIT/External (realm of contingency)





empirico – sociological level of practical reasoning
assertion as action/conduct
performative derived from interestedness
action – related argumentation
o regimes of argumentative practices having “discursive
selectivity”
o the arguments of policy makers
o the coherence of a policy program as carried out by elite actors



External Rational Reconstruction
as a process-tracing of the contingent interaction within a path
dependent institutional context

____________________ mediated by an internal dialectic ____________________

5B.

The IMPLICIT/internal (realm of necessity)




Grammatological, juridico-discursive order with “internal
relations”
Assertion as normativity
Epistemological claim/warranted assertion derived from
committedness (“self-referring”)
o
o
o
o



the argument itself: commitments as normative core
interpellation of propositions
resonance with value form categorials
immanent with legitimation arguments

Rational Reconstraction of the Internal Relations of the immanent
and emergent normativity “boiled off from its institutional husk” as an
“arc of subject positions” within an immanent rationale.

Following Campbell and Pedersen24, CI can be seen as a strand of discursive
institutinalism (DI). By DI, Campbell and Pedersen denote what we called IN,
institutional normativism (IN). DI focuses on perceptions and meanings in “discourse
24
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theoretical terms” (dtt‟s), but not in terms of apriori categorials of legitimation that
precede cultural perceptions and legal meanings. DI’s principal concern is to trace
the process by which an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations are
translated into institutional patterns--how we are discursively structured, and the ways
in which policy debate is conducted.
Kjaer 25 understands DI as the relationship between discourse and institution as the
outcome of historically specified ways of situating and organizing practices in a
society with horizons of meaning. Hay (2001) defines a strand of DI as the
“ideational institutionalist approach” (II) as a process-tracing of the way people
position one another through the use of a widely employed discourse; as a sociology
of practical knowledge detailing the application of dominant ideas/legitimations by
policy-makers.26
DI involves “normic statements.”27 This is the level of theory “which leaves open the
question whether people are doing what people invariably do in those uniquely
complicated circumstances or are doing one of the comparatively few things which
people…choose to do in such circumstances.”
The II strand of DI/IN focuses on performatives of learning and problem-solving-practical judgments wherein intuitions, understandings, commitments and pragmatic
actions align and combine. In so doing, II details a regime of propositionally
differentiated speech acts, emerging out of institutional facticity. And it identifies the
compelling reasons for what we say or do in concrete situations.
Beyond policy-makers‟ application of ideas, CI is the strand of DI/IN that turns to the
ideas themselves, and to the argumentative logic of a legitimation. It also turns to the
experience of that argumentative logic. This is what is referred to in policy analysis
as “the argumentative turn.” 28 This “argumentative turn” opens up the commitments
implicit in the decision-making of governance, and captures the endogenous
emergence of argumentative logic that breaks with hegemonic patterns of legitimizing
thinking associated with a regime.
Argumentative propositions are defined which problematize hegemonic normative
statements--which counter justifying assertions of regime leaders. Thus, CI can
elucidate ideas and actions which are not readily predicted by the rational
reconstruction of interest-based behavior--and which do not necessarily follow from
historical path dependencies. Rather, these ideas and actions may resonate with either
forgotten long standing values, like those of reflexive labor law and the governance of
social law--or with newly emerging values.

25
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The “argumentative turn” is influenced by the poststructural focus on the practices in
which humans engage--not the humans themselves, nor the structures by which they
are constrained. Such focus centers on the way arguments are made--within a
discursive ensemble--and can be read as a “text.” How does a group of people
creatively bring a “self-referential” model of practices into existence, how they think
about, how they talk about it, how they transubstantiate it, maintain and reform it. 29
The argumentative turn follows the discursive turn in developing the study of
institutional normativism beyond a sociology of practical knowledge of iterated
games described by Gicondomenico Majone (1989).
Geoffrey Hawthorn30 noted that Karl Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge “never
approach[ed] a resolution to the very difficult question of the relation between “the
internal and external interpretations of ideas.” CI extends the critical theory of
Habermas to a focus on the internal relations of argument, and beyond the external
relationism of applied practical knowledge that characterizes II. Whereas HI’s focus
is causality and capacity, II’s focus is how ideas are constituted (constructed) and
framed. CI’s internalism transcends historicism and sociology with a focus on
principles and the immanence of their argument. HI and II operate on the level of
institutional facticity, whereas CI operates on the level of principles, value-form
categorials that historicism and sociology bracket out.
The autonomies of relational contracting and private law regimes reflect the pluralism
of instituted associations and instituting associations that motivated Maitland, Laski,
Heller and Neuman to understand that pluralism as the central of post-liberal contract
law and labor law as well as political theory. Twentieth century contract law and
labor law sought to institutionalize social reflection and regulation of enduring class
conflict, group conflict and corporate conflict.
Social rights and social law can be understood in terms of the “polycontextuality” of
autonomous non-staff regimes legislating, regulating and adjudicating within their
own subsystems; as well as in relating to each other. Such as approach studies the
contextual space between such regimes as a space for the collision of discourses,
language games, textualities and projects.
Within this hierarchy of these subsystems, contract appears no longer as merely an
economic exchange between respective individual persons, but as a space for finding
differently contracting discursive projects with emerging discursive rights--i.e., rights
to interpret competing claims. Networks of relational contracting sustained by the
value of future relationships take into account an autonomous interactive normative
order wherein mutually accepted interpretation emerges. Each network has its own
autonomous path dependent institutional trajectories.
Institutions matter. And institutionalisms matter. And further to follow Bo Rothstein,
just institutions matter. Critical institutionalism (C1) focuses on the claims of justice
inherent in institutional/institutionalizing practices. Out of the immanent tradition of
29
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social law and social rights such a critical institutionalism can be understood and
made explicit, as we comprehend implicit normative commitments.
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